Introduction
The Member States' military capability deficits are well known. These can be attributed to nationally focused investment which leads to duplication and non-interoperability, the lack of a fully-fledged European strategic culture which would provide top-down guidance as to which capabilities need to be developed and finally Member States' static and declining defence budgets. Attempts to close the EU's numerous military deficits have been haphazard and have often been no more than a documenting exercise where capability gaps are identified but little is done to actually close them (the ECAP process being a case in point).
Nonetheless, there are significant financial imperatives for moving towards a greater use of pooling due to the current economic crisis. This article therefore analyses the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in military capability development and in particular focuses on the role that Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) can play to encourage the Member States to move from defence sovereignty to pooled defence resources. 1 Two interconnected research questions provide the core focus for the research. 1.
What does PSCD add to what currently exists and to what extent is this likely to re-invigorate capability development? 2.
To what extent can the EDA play a role in developing PSCD thus enabling the concept to succeed? Indeed, the introduction of PSCD in the Treaty of Lisbon can be seen as another 'perceived opportunity' 2 for the EU Member States to finally begin to address their capability gaps. Nonetheless, whether significant change actually materialises will depend upon how such a concept is implemented in practice and the mechanisms in place within the EDA to formalise and encourage cooperation. 2 A recent attempt at what is partly envisaged under PSCD can already be highlighted by the EU Battlegroups which have not yet been deployed despite opportunities to do so. This highlights a major hurdle in increasing the EU's actorness because whilst PSCD might act as a mechanism to close capability gaps it is not a mechanism to overcome political willingness problems. Indeed it is argued that the Battlegroups provide a warning for PSCD in that only capabilities which are useful and most importantly usable should be developed. Finally, it highlights that conflicting visions of European security 3 including when and where force is used has impacted upon the political willingness to use the Battlegroups -divisions which will form the basis of discussions on the formation of PSCD.
Nonetheless, convergence is beginning to take place as highlighted in the European Security Strategy, 4 which combined with the albeit limited learning from military operations which have occurred in addition to the long term vision already carried out within the EDA 5 offers a rough roadmap for capability development. Indeed we argue that the EDA has the potential to be a champion of PSCD, particularly in relation to the operationalisation of the concept. To offer a full insight into how these conflicting visions impact on the work of the EDA and capability development, strategic culture will be used. A security community's strategic culture provides its policy-makers with a range of beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning what actions are appropriate within the security and defence field which subsequently shapes their perceptions of defence issues. These relate to when, where and how force is used and provide an insight as to the extent to which differences between the Member States impact on the EU's actorness in defence. Therefore strategic culture enables a top down approach to capability development to be created which begins with what the EU wants to do in the world and then which capabilities need to be created to fulfil this rather than a bottom up approach. 
European Strategic Culture
This article posits that due to the lack of a fully fledged strategic culture, agreement on when, where and how force is used is only in its infancy and as such has hindered EU defence efforts. Therefore, military capability development through the EDA has been weak as Member States prefer national initiatives. Additionally, without an agreement on what role the EU should play, it is difficult to be decisive concerning which military capabilities to acquire.
Strategic culture has been utilised from both a country and EU perspective. It can be defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, held by a security community which has had a 'unique historical experience'. 6 Of central importance is the interpretation of these historical experiences which as Berger states are 'transmitted through socialization; and by providing individuals with cognitive maps, they serve as filters through which subsequent 4 events and experiences are apprehended'. 7 Whilst strategic culture emphasises continuity over change, this does not mean that the concept is static. Change can occur in response to events in the external security environment, although this is not automatic as a strategic culture once socialised is also institutionalised. As Meyer highlights 'norms are so stable because they are often institutionalised in laws, policies and power structures'. 8 These institutionalised beliefs and values can impact upon which policy options are available. As such, strategic culture acts as a lens through which external security issues are considered relevant or otherwise. The most profound changes occur in reaction to war and conflict. In this instance a country's strategic culture is replaced with another. Normally, however, change only occurs incrementally in response to new security conditions such as 9/11. 9 In this instance two or more parts of a strategic culture come into conflict with each other which leads to a realignment. 
Developing PSCD
PSCD is a new tool for capability development which is part of the Lisbon Treaty and previously the European Constitution. It allows for groups of Member States who are military able and politically willing, to enhance their military capabilities including the ability to contribute to a Battlegroup. 17 To meet these objectives, Article 2 of the protocol on PSCD specifies five areas of action. These include: agreeing on objectives for the level of investment in defence equipment; bringing defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, by harmonizing the identification of military needs, by pooling, and where appropriate specialisation; to enhance force availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability by setting common objectives regarding the commitment of forces; addressing shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism and taking part where 8 appropriate in equipment programmes within the EDA. 18 The decision to establish PSCD can be taken by qualified majority voting as opposed to unanimity voting, making the mechanism easier to establish, at least on paper.
PSCD is meant to add to what already exists through the establishment of a high level of criteria thus ensuring that capability development is structured. 19 Indeed for the first time within the area of CSDP, a binding leverage will be introduced, meaning that PSCD constitutes a very rare opportunity. 20 This is because participating Member States would have to meet a number of objectives aimed at the improvement of military capabilities or would have to leave PSCD. Thus the potential for meaningful capability development through PSCD is very real. It would add value through increasing cost effectiveness, multinational cooperation, assessment, increased sustainability and finally inclusiveness and flexibility in reaching the criteria. 21 Thus PSCD should encourage the Member States to move from defence sovereignty towards pooled defence resources. Indeed for all Member States, apart from France and the UK, PSCD makes sense due to the pooling element although it should be stated that not all small and medium Member States are in favour. 22 This is particularly the case in the context of the current financial crisis where defence budgets are under pressure.
Therefore PSCD acts as a way of acquiring essential capabilities at less cost. It could even be considered that all PSCD needs to be a success is to save money. 23 Indeed this is the major attraction of PSCD. A report on PSCD by the West European Union also underlines this by emphasising that PSCD must be attractive which can be done by 'offering a sufficient return on investment to provide an incentive for the non-participating states to join it'. 24 To discuss PSCD, a seminar took place under the Spanish Presidency in mid March 2010 in Brussels. Whilst the Spanish have placed PSCD on the agenda, they have at the same time not taken the lead and instead were very careful regarding pushing the idea. 25 Indeed there did not 9 appear to be a champion for PSCD, be it a Member State or a group of Member States, capable of placing the issue on the agenda of the European Council, although there was the suggestion that the Weimar group could fulfil this role. 26 Indeed there have been some preliminary reflections within the Weimar group regarding some initial basic ideas for PSCD. 27 Under the Belgium Presidency in the second half of 2010, an assertive position on the issue has been taken, including a position paper by the next three holders of the Presidency -Belgium, Hungary and Poland as well as a seminar which took place on 13 July 2010. This was attended by 120 national experts. 28 Nonetheless, without one or more of the big Member State to get fully behind the initiative and give it some momentum, there is only so much the Belgians and Spaniards can do to push PSCD forward. 29 Indeed the outcome of the Belgian Presidency was the Ghent initiative which made no mention of PSCD and instead focused on 'Pooling and Sharing'.
Criteria for PSCD
A number of issues still remain to be resolved before PSCD can be initiated. These essentially revolve around the criteria which should be put in place when establishing PSCD. First, will there be one PSCD or several relating to different capabilities? In essence, the idea is to have one PSCD and within that there will be clusters of Member States. Each participating state will be able to decide on the types of projects it wants to take part in and how to cooperate, but all states will abide by a common set of criteria. 30 It is important to note, that PSCD should be as inclusive as possible. In this respect, the more participating Member States, the more synergies and effects of scale which can be created. 31 Additionally to make PSCD selective would create a two tier EU in defence. Hence, there would be no incentive for those in the second league to increase their military capabilities. 32 Thus as Herz states, 'it is important to find a middle ground between too loose criteria for membership to the PSCoop
[PSCD] which would defeat its point of faster integration, and too constricting criteria which 10 would reduce the number of Member States involved'. 33 Indeed it is this concern over exclusion which has led to some Member States' negative opinion of PSCD.
To alleviate this problem, criteria should be fulfilled by a specific date rather than be a condition of initial entry. Biscop could represent a vehicle with which PSCD can eventually be operationalised.
The Implementation of the EU Battlegroup Concept: A Warning for PSCD?
How successful is PSCD likely to be and will it facilitate the top down approach which is currently missing from CSDP? One way of assessing this and to highlight its pitfalls is through the EU Battlegroup Concept which can be seen as a de-facto or operational form of PSCD. 39 A Battlegroup comprises 1500 armed force personnel and can be formed either unilaterally or multinationally. 40 Evidently it is the multinational aspect which makes the German policy-makers that France is using CSDP to upload its post-colonial responsibilities to the EU level. 43 This issue also has the potential to affect PSCD. After creating the capabilities, will the Member States actually deploy them? Whilst it might appear that this issue has the ability to affect the Battlegroups more than PSCD due to the former's rotational nature, the same might also occur in PSCD if Member States decide to specialise or if a group of likeminded states come together to create the same capability. This is due to the fact that one country could block the use of a particular capability. 44 Nonetheless, Biscop states that 'the more integrated
Europe's military capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as one'. 45 From this perspective, inclusivity is key to preventing PSCD from suffering the same problems as the Battlegroups. This is particularly so in the context of a lack of any strategic defence document detailing where the EU's interests actually lie. However without any binding commitment regarding equipment on the ground in operations, it is difficult to see how this will overcome political willingness problems in the context of PSCD.
Although it might appear that the Battlegroups have failed in their current form, the concept has succeeded in generating additional capabilities in some Member States as highlighted by 
The EDA: a champion for PSCD?

Governance and project areas
The prompted by an array of economic and identity-related factors, 50 the creation of the EDA became a reality after key Member States' preferences converged on the EU level. 51 After years of opposing the creation of an EU based Agency in the field of armaments, defence procurement and cooperation, Britain agreed with the French proposals for setting up such a body. 52 Paris suggested that the new body will not be a traditional national armaments agency focused exclusively on defence procurement, but rather a 'capabilities agency', bringing together research, development, and procurement and providing the political framework for common European armament projects. Thus, it would also have an important political roleto direct and evaluate Member States' progress towards fulfilling their capability commitments. 53 The deal between the UK and France was signed at their bilateral summit in . 15 The Agency has been operational ever since, but only two years ago the Treaty of Lisbon codified it, thus giving it an explicit legal personality. Under Art. 28d (1 & 2) , the EDA has a number of tasks: to identify and evaluate common military capability objectives; to promote the harmonisation of operational needs and the adoption of procurement methods; to propose multilateral projects and ensure the coordination of the respective programmes; to support and coordinate EU level defence research and development activities; to improve the effectiveness of military expenditure within the EU; and identify measures for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector.
The Agency currently has 26 participating Member States. 54 It carries out its tasks in liaison with the Commission and its statute, seat and operational rules are determined by a Council decision based on a QMV procedure. 55 Thus, it introduces a number of supranational elements in the defence field. These include the establishment of a common pool of information, the development of common standards that promote greater harmonization and "more coherence and integration in defence cooperation among EU Member States". 56 However the EDA fundamentally remains an intergovernmental body. Having limited mandate and power from the Member States, geared mostly towards producing and providing information to them and being governed by ministers or governmental appointees, the EDA clearly exhibits characteristics of a classic inter-governmental agency. 
The EDA's role in the operationalisation of the PSCD
In relation to PSCD, the EDA does not have any decision making power for its actual operationalisation (this stays firmly within the PSC and the Council) but rather may have an 18 expert say in its practical set up and further development. The EDA possesses an enormous database of all the projects and programmes of its participating Member States and could therefore provide the relevant information for setting up the criteria for PSCD. Based on that information, the EDA can also be useful for the actual implementation of the concept. In addition, the EDA is supposed to give a regular assessment of the PSCD participating
Member States' contributions with regards to identified capability needs for the operationalisation of PSCD. 68 Also, thanks to its expert know-how it can provide regular evaluation of its practical implementation. In particular, it can be useful in identifying shortfalls in capability standards and suggesting ways to tackle them. 69 Another important function of the EDA in the operationalisation of PSCD is that it may provide a useful forum for political dialogue. It is realistic to assume that initially not all EDA Member States will become participants in PSCD but still the EDA may provide a framework for transparent dialogue between both the participating and non-participating states. Some consider that this may lead to greater socialisation in the domain of joint capability development and thus alleviate some of the existing divisions and suspicions among the Member States. 70 Moreover, this may also provide for greater accountability in PSCD matters. In this respect PSCD may in fact help in raising the profile of the EDA by making it more engaged and politically visible. Related to the latter, the very fact that the High
Representative is also the chair of the EDA helps in raising its political visibility. 71 In particular it may contribute towards the faster implementation of some of the most demanding projects, by generating the needed political and financial resources for this to happen. The EDA also has a strong potential to boost the civil-military interface in crisis management operations because the projects that are currently running -e.g. maritime surveillance, software defined radio, transport helicopter training -have value and potential usefulness for both the military and civilian domains. All in all, the EDA can be seen as a facilitator that prompts the Member States to cooperate and participate in joint projects, and hence it can play an important role in operationalising PSCD. 75 However, the main question regards whether the EDA manages to capitalise on its potential to contribute to the PSCD project -having in mind the existence of a number of issues regarding Member States' motivation to fully work through the EDA.
Key problem areas
20
Similarly to the difficulties in operationalising the Battlegroup Concept, some of the main problems facing the EDA relate to the issue of political will. In particular they point to two of the earlier identified divisions among the Member States: defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources; and Europeanist vs. Atlanticist approaches to security and defence. The other two divisions -regional vs. global approach; and pro-active on the use of force vs.
restrictions concerning the use of force -are also relevant, as they set the parameters within which the EDA and PSCD have to work. However, since this has been covered in section 2.2., the following sections build on this foundation by outlining the practical problems that occur in fully utilising the potential of the EDA which the first two divisions create.
Some consider that initially the EDA was more active and entrepreneurial, "more at the front"
and hence more visible than today. 76 Among the main reasons are the lack of a strong leadership and the gradual change in thinking among the EDA's staff -from the first generation which was more enthusiastic in starting the new project, to the current one which has a much more pragmatic attitude. 77 However, the more acute problems facing the EDA are related to the following divisions among the EU Member States.
Going European or remaining national?
Firstly not all Member States see the added value in doing business through the EDA -i.e. by joining trans-national projects within its framework. As it is already known, one of the EDA's main goals is to support the creation of an internal EU defence market and integrated European defence industry, hence the principle of pooled defence resources. 78 In 2006 
Buying American or choosing European?
Another acute problem facing the work of the EDA and again leading to weak political European interest in defence procurement, and armaments production it seems that it is premature to talk about a sufficiently developed European strategic culture in this domain.
This weakens both the potential of the Member States to operationalise PSCD and the ability of the EDA to act as a promoter of the new concept.
Conclusion
This article has highlighted the missing defence component -or the 'D' -in CSDP by analysing the lack of progress on military capability development thus far. It applied the concept of strategic culture including four closely related conflicting visions among the EU Member States concerning European security and defence. Within this, it has highlighted the work of the EDA and the extent to which PSCD can alleviate these problems. In so doing, it
has underlined the problems of defence procurement and has used the Battlegroups to highlight the potential pitfalls of PSCD. 24 The four conflicting visions were focused on: Atlanticism vs. Europeanist approaches, a regional vs. global approach to security and defence, pro-active on the use of force vs.
restrictions concerning the use of force and defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources.
Member States' geographical approach to defence and their approach to using force, impacts on political willingness. This connects to whether Member States are willing to deploy the capabilities they have invested in, as well as which military procurement projects they will participate in. Relating to this, the Battlegroup Concept highlighted that whilst Member States were committed to the concept on paper, deploying them was an issue for countries such as Germany which has restrictions on the use force and a more regional approach to defence. In this respect, PSCD provides an opportunity for military capability development but does not avoid the obstacle of Member States failing to deploy the capabilities that have been created due to a lack of defence interests. resources, participating Member States will be forced to look at when and where these capabilities should be used. Indeed, this is a necessity to ensure that PSCD does not become another 'missed opportunity' in the story of the development of CSDP. However, in the context of an insufficiently developed EU strategic culture in defence and the lack of active leadership for promoting PSCD it seems that the concept might not be operationalised any time soon, underlined by the move to 'Pooling and Sharing' which has seemingly replaced PSCD. In this respect, while the EDA may continue its work successfully in that military capabilities will be developed, the 'D' will still be missing.
